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PROBABILITY AND THE OPEN FUTURE VIEW
Alexander R. Pruss
I defend a simple argument for why considerations of epistemic probabil-
ity should lead us away from Open Future views according to which claims 
about the future are never true. 
1. Introduction
The Open Future (OF) view holds, among other things, that no temporally 
contingent proposition affirming what will be the case is true. A temporal-
ly contingent proposition is one that is not entailed by the present and past 
states of the world, and defenders of OF views take future indeterminis-
tic events or future libertarian-free choices as paradigmatic examples. I 
shall call a temporally contingent proposition affirming what will be the 
case a “future contingent proposition.” There are two variants of the OF 
view, corresponding to two accounts of the truth value of future contin-
gent propositions: the older No Truth Value (NTV) view, perhaps held by 
Aristotle, on which future contingent propositions lack truth value, and 
what might be called an Error Theory (ET) on which future contingent 
propositions are simply false, recently defended by Rhoda, Boyd and Belt1 
(hereinafter referred to as RBB). NTV requires a denial of bivalence: future 
contingent propositions are neither true nor false. ET, on the other hand, 
requires a denial of the principle that ~will(s) ⇒ will(~s), where the double 
arrow is entailment: it is not the case that I will eat dinner tomorrow (that 
is a temporally contingent claim), but likewise it is not the case that I will 
tomorrow fail to eat dinner.
Open Theism (OT) holds that God does not know any future contin-
gent propositions. OF conjoined with the existence of God entails OT, as-
suming that only true propositions can be known. On the other hand, the 
conjunction of OT with the proposition that God knows all true proposi-
tions entails OF’s claims about future contingent propositions not being 
true. Since it would appear to lessen the departure from traditional theism 
if the defender of OT were able to affirm that God knows all true proposi-
tions, a defender of OT has good reason to try to defend OF, or at least its 
claim about future contingent propositions not being true. Likewise, if we 
1Alan R. Rhoda, Gregory A. Boyd and Thomas G. Belt, “Open Theism, Omniscience, and 
the Nature of the Future,” Faith and Philosophy 23 (2006), pp. 432–459.
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affirm that God knows all true propositions, then a denial of OT entails a 
denial of OF.
But OF is very unlikely to be true. My argument is simple in form, but 
after giving it, I shall consider objections. In the following I will work with 
a consistent system of epistemic probabilities. I shall write T(p) for the 
claim that p is true and FC(p) for the claim that p is a future contingent 
proposition. I shall work within System T of modal logic (which is weaker 
than S4 or S5). I need three crucial but very plausible axioms about truth 
and probability, where K is our current background information:
(1) p ⇒ T(p)
(2) if p&K ⇒ q, then P(p|K) ≤ P(q|K)
(3) P(~p|K) = 1 − P(p|K).
These indeed seem highly plausible. If (2) gives one any pause, it suffices 
to note that it follows quickly from the pair of axioms that (i) if p ⇒ q, then 
P(p|K) ≤ P(q|K), and (ii) P(p&K|K) = P(p|K). 
At the same time, there is at least one adherent of OF who denies (1): 
Keith DeRose,2 who accepts a variant of NTV according to which for a 
future contingent p it is the case that p or ~p, but it is not the case that Tp 
or T~p. In other words, DeRose affirms excluded middle but denies biva-
lence. However, I take (1) to be extremely plausible—plausible enough not 
to need argument. It would go beyond the scope of this paper to argue for 
(1). I will, nonetheless, make one note about DeRose’s version of OF. There 
is a way in which DeRose’s version of OF is weaker than other versions 
of OF, because DeRose’s version of OF is actually compatible with God’s 
knowing future contingents. The reason for that is that compatibly with 
this version of OF one can deny the principle that xKp ⇒ Tp (where xKp 
means that x knows p) and replace it with the principle that xKp ⇒ p. And 
once one does that, one can actually hold that God knows future contin-
gents: thus, God may know that I will mow the lawn tomorrow, and that 
he knows it entails that I will do it, but it does not entail that it is true that 
I will do it. So even if one can get out of my argument by denying (1), still 
the present argument may at least work against those versions of OF that 
force one to adopt OT. 
I also need one more assumption for my argument. This assumption is 
not an axiom, and the OF advocate will want to reject it, but the assump-
tion nonetheless is true and common-sensical, and I will sketch an argu-
ment for its truth:
(4) There is a proposition p such that P(p & FC(p) | K) > 0.99.
Here is one way to argue for (4). Let p be that claim that it will be the 
case that I do not win the jackpot in the next drawing of the California 
2Keith DeRose, comment on “Modality and Open Future,” comment posted February 26, 
2009 1:51 a.m. at http://prosblogion.ektopos.com/archives/2009/02/modality-and-op.html.
192 Faith and Philosophy
State Lottery. Now, I am very unlikely to play, not even being in Califor-
nia, and second, even if I play, I am extremely unlikely to win the jackpot. 
Thus, we may conservatively suppose, 
(5) P(p|K) > 0.999999. 
Moreover, our current background knowledge K entails that p is a future 
contingent proposition, since p plainly depends on my free choice wheth-
er to play the California State Lottery, and if so, then on what numbers to 
choose, as well as on what numbers are picked as winning numbers. All 
of this is contingent. Granted the rules of the California State Lottery could 
change in such a way as to specify that necessarily Alexander Pruss does 
not win, but such a change would also depend on contingencies. Thus, we 
can be extremely close to certain that FC(p), so that we can say: 
(6) P(FC(p) | K) > 0.999.
Putting (5) and (6) together, we easily get P(p & FC(p) | K) > 0.99. I think we 
are quite confident of this claim. And (4) immediately follows.
Given (1)–(4), the argument against OF is a mere technicality. Let p be 
as in (4). Now, OF entails that no future contingent proposition is true. 
Therefore, OF ⇒ ~(FC(p) & Tp). Thus:
(7) P(OF|K) ≤ P(~(FC(p) & Tp) | K) = 1 – P(FC(p) & Tp | K),
where the inequality follows from (2) and the equality follows from (3). It 
follows from (1) that 
(8) (FC(p) & p) ⇒ (FC(p) & Tp)
(this step uses the theorem that if a ⇒ b, then c&a ⇒ c&b, which can be eas-
ily proved3 to hold in System T). Therefore, by (2), we have 
(9) P(FC(p) & p | K) ≤ P(FC(p) & Tp | K). 
It follows from (7) and (9) that:
(10) P(OF|K) ≤ 1 – P(FC(p) & p | K),
Applying (4), we conclude that
(11) P(OF|K) ≤ 1 − P(FC(p) & p |K) < 0.01.
Thus, the epistemic probability of OF given our current knowledge is less 
than 0.01. A proposition whose epistemic probability given our current 
knowledge is less than 0.01 should be rejected, unless there is some non-
epistemic justification. Hence, the Open Future view should be rejected. 
3It is a tautology that (a ⊃ b) ⊃ (c&a ⊃ c&b). Therefore, by the Necessitation Axiom (which 
says that if r is a theorem, then so is Lr, where L is the necessity operator), it is a theorem that 
L[(a ⊃ b) ⊃ (c&a ⊃ c&b)]. Then by the Distribution Axiom (which says that L(r ⊃ s) ⊃ (Lr ⊃ 
Ls)) and modus ponens, it is a theorem that L(a ⊃ b) ⊃ L(c&a ⊃ c&b). Now, suppose we have a 
⇒ b. Then, by definition of entailment, L(a ⊃ b). Using the theorem we just proved, that L(a 
⊃ b) ⊃ L(c&a ⊃ c&b), and modus ponens, we conclude that L(a&c ⊃ b&c) or, equivalently, that 
c&a ⇒ c&b.
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2. Objections
i. Intuitionistic logic. Axiom (3), applied twice, implies that P(~~p|K) = 
P(p|K). This may well be too close to the axiom of Double Negation (DN), 
~~p ⇔ p, for intuitionistic logicians to be comfortable with (3). 
But I do not think many defenders of OF will want to follow intuition-
istic logicians. After all, denying DN destroys the validity of reductio ad 
absurdum arguments, which surely we do not want to do. One might try 
to deny (3) in the special case of future contingent propositions and their 
negations, but that is objectionably ad hoc. And if DN is not secure in the 
case of propositions about the future, this precedent would allow one to 
always escape from any reductio argument by saying that that argument 
provided yet another case of an exception to DN.
ii. Epistemic probabilities. On what grounds could I assign probabilities, 
or at least probability bounds, to future contingent propositions, such as 
are required by (4)?
Obviously, there is much inductive evidence for the unlikelihood of 
any particular person winning a particular drawing of the lottery. Sup-
pose that p was a proposition affirming that at t, I do not win the jackpot 
in the California State Lottery drawing. Assuming we assign a high prob-
ability to the time t existing, we would assign this a high prior probability, 
regardless of whether t is in the past, present or future. And, in the case 
where t is in the near future and K is our present background knowledge, 
the probability remains high. Similarly we have much inductive and intui-
tive evidence for p being a future contingent proposition—in fact, while p 
will not be entailed by K, the claim that p is a future contingent proposi-
tion may well be entailed by K.
Any case of a proposition whose status as a future contingent propo-
sition is entailed by our present background knowledge but where the 
proposition is strongly inductively confirmed will do for (4). 
If we are not able to assign high probabilities to future contingent propo-
sitions, then our decision making about the future is in trouble. And my 
argument does not even require spectacularly high probabilities. It seems 
quite likely that under most circumstances, we wouldn’t spend our money 
on a plane ticket unless the probability that the plane would successfully ar-
rive at the destination is at least 0.75. But plugging this value into my main 
argument, and assuming that K contains the fact that whether we safely 
and successfully make the trip is temporally contingent, will give us the 
claim that P(OF|K) ≤ 0.25. And the defender of OF won’t like that, either.
iii. The Error Theory and (4). The Error Theorist is committed to denying 
(4). For according to the Error Theory, if p is a future contingent proposi-
tion, then p is false. Hence, if we are close to certain of the Error Theory, we 
will be close to certain that p is false, and thus P(p|K) will be close to zero 
rather than close to 1 as (4) would require.
At the same time, RBB in their development of ET appear to feel quite 
free to make claims about probabilities of future contingent propositions, 
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and do not seem to think that these probabilities are all close to zero. Their 
account appears to be grounded in the notion of “causal force.” Thus, 
the probability of a future event seems to be proportional to the amount 
of causal force that the present state of the world has for producing that 
event. If the causal force of the present state is sufficient to determine the 
event to happen, the probability is 1, and if the causal force of the present 
state is sufficient to determine the event not to happen, the probability is 
zero, but in-between causal forces give in-between probabilities.
It appears, then, that RBB are committed to (4), since there should be 
plenty of propositions p whose status as future contingent propositions is 
entailed by K but where there is very high causal force in favor of p. If so, 
then my argument succeeds. 
But in fact that is probably not the right way to read the relation be-
tween RBB and my argument. For my argument concerns epistemic prob-
abilities, while the causal force story surely goes along not with epistemic 
but objective probabilities. Thus, the current objection to my argument 
becomes this: While there is a high objective probability of p, the epistemic 
probability of p is not high.
To push this objection through, it would be necessary for RBB to deny 
Lewis’s Principal Principle that epistemic probabilities should match 
objective probabilities when the objective probabilities are known. But 
even if one does not wish to affirm the Principal Principle in every case, 
it would be a very uncomfortable thing in this case to say that it is objec-
tively very likely that I will fail to win the California State Lottery, but that 
the epistemic probability of the very same claim is zero, since I know that 
p is false on ET. 
Moreover, since prudence dictates that I should make my decisions on 
the basis of the very high probability of my failing to win the California 
State Lottery, prudential decisions would have to be based on the objective 
rather than epistemic probabilities. This is an uncomfortable position. After 
all, in cases where the objective probabilities are unknown, the epistemic 
ones are surely what I should go by. So the resulting view of deliberation 
would have to be a hybrid one on which I use objective probabilities in 
some cases and epistemic ones in others, and I make no attempt to make 
the epistemic ones match the objective ones. This is not plausible. 
iv. Two senses of “will.” ET can accommodate ordinary language by say-
ing that there is a weaker sense of “will” which does not require for the 
truth of “S will happen” that the causal force of present events render 
S inevitable. All that is required is a high degree of force, and the exact 
degree required depends on the conversational context. In any case, the 
degree required is such as to ensure at least a one-half objective probabil-
ity (understanding objective probabilities as correlated with causal force, 
as in the discussion of objection iii). In that case, P(p|K) need not be close 
to zero, as it would be on the stronger sense of “will.”
But if p is the claim that I will fail to win the next California State Lot-
tery, then we want to be able to say that 0 < P(p|K) < 1, with P(p|K) closer 
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to 1 than to 0. On the strong reading of “will,” according to ET advocates, 
I get P(p|K)=0, since all future contingent propositions have to be false 
then. But on the weak reading of “will,” p says merely that the present 
state of things tends causally very strongly against my winning. But that 
the present state of things tends causally very strongly against my win-
ning is not merely highly probable, but certain—I know for sure that I am 
unlikely to win. Thus, on this understanding of p, P(p|K)=1. But that’s 
wrong, too. There is a tiny chance that I will both play and win. So neither 
reading works.
v. Assertibility. In light of the response to objection iv, one might supple-
ment OF with a non-realist account of ordinary uses of “will.”4 This ac-
count would be parallel to conditional probability accounts of condition-
als, like that of Edgington,5 which focus on assertibility conditions and 
do not provide truth conditions. On Edgington’s view, a → b is assertible 
provided P(b|a&K) is high (for an appropriate K). But it is not the case that 
there are probabilistic truth-conditions for a → b. It is not, for instance, the 
case that a → b is true if and only if P(b|a&K) exceeds some value p0.6 One 
way to get out of my argument on an assertibility analysis of “will,” will 
then be to deny (1) when p is a future contingent proposition, not for the 
DeRose reason discussed above, but for an irrealist reason.
However, a standard worry about theories that dispense with truth 
conditions and focus on assertibility is what to do with logical connections 
between sentences that lack truth conditions. Thus, the emotivist (emotiv-
ism is an assertibility theory according to which “A is wrong” is assertible 
if and only if one has a strong moral feeling against A) has a hard time 
explaining plausible conditionals such as “If all abortions are wrong, then 
all late abortions are wrong.” Similarly, an assertibility theorist about con-
ditionals may have difficulties about nested conditionals, disjunctions of 
conditionals, and so on. 
Now, in the case of conditionals, some of these difficulties will not be 
as pressing, simply because in ordinary language we are loath to embed 
conditionals in larger conditionals, and we ordinarily rarely combine a 
sentence involving a conditional truth-functionally with another sentence 
except by way of conjunction. 
However, we are quite willing to embed future-tensed claims, includ-
ing ones expressing future contingent propositions, in larger sentences. 
Thus, we are willing to say things like: “If this method didn’t work yes-
terday, it won’t work tomorrow,” “If George does not pay her back tomor-
4It could be that this is in fact what RBB claim.
5Dorothy Edgington, “On Conditionals,” Mind 104 (1995), pp. 235–329.
6Such truth-conditions would fail in ways precisely parallel to the way in which it will 
not do to analyze “I will fail to win the California State Lottery” as an assertion that there 
is a high objective probability that I fail to win the California State Lottery. For on such an 
analysis, it would be certain that I will fail to win the California State Lottery, and likewise 
it would be certain that were I to play the lottery, I would lose, because it is certain that 
P(lose|play&K) exceeds just about any reasonable p0, whereas we do not want to say that 
either the “will” claim or the conditional claim is certain. 
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row, then next week he will be a marked man” and “Either he will show 
up for the exam or I will give him an F.” If a sentence does not express a 
proposition, it is quite mysterious how one can combine it logically with 
other sentences.7
Moreover, what is the assertibility theorist about “will” to do with cases 
where the speaker does not know whether a given claim is about the past, 
present or future? For instance, you know that a friend on another conti-
nent is having an operation today. You say: “Today, my friend is having an 
operation,” but do not know whether the operation is past, present or fu-
ture. Surely we do not want to say that this is a disjunction of three claims, 
two of which have truth conditions, while the third does not: “Today my 
friend had an operation or right now my friend is having an operation or 
my friend will have an operation today.”
Conclusions
Many Open Future theories have a difficulty with properly handling 
probabilistic claims about the future. In general, semantic views that 
hold that a class of propositions lacks truth value are going to make it 
difficult to assign probabilities to these propositions (think of the chal-
lenges for an emotivist to make sense of “Probably this operation is mor-
ally required”), while semantic views that hold a class of propositions 
to be false are going to make it problematic to assign any probabilities 
other than zero to propositions in that class. This general fact means, for 
instance, that anti-Molinists who deny that subjunctive conditionals of 
freedom have truth value had better not turn around and assign prob-
abilities to these conditionals.8
Baylor University
7It’s worth noting parenthetically that problems with logical combination may also affect 
ET. Thus, if we take it that a necessary falsehood entails every proposition, an incompatibilist 
Error Theorist will have to say: “That George will freely commit a theft entails that George 
will be morally perfect.” For the antecedent, according to ET combined with incompati-
bilism, is necessarily false.
8I am grateful to two anonymous referees as well as to Thomas Flint for a careful reading 
of this paper and a number of suggestions, many of which I have followed. I am also grateful 
to a number of commenters on prosblogion.ektopos.com.
